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Appellees commence their brief by stating (p.6) that they have difficulty in
identifying the issues raised on appeal".. .because they are confusing." This is
surprising as each point is specifically identified, with substantiating authorities.
Such an approach sets the tone for the remainder of Appellees' brief.
Appellees attempt to create confusion where none exists. They do not
question or refute any statement of fact set forth by Appellant, which Appellant
supported with specific record references. Appellees do not set forth a
counterstatement of facts merely citing verbatim the decision of the lower court in
lieu thereof, sans any references to the record to support them. As pointed out in
Appellant's brief, several of the facts referred to therein were contrary to the record
or unfounded suppositions of the lower court on which it based its conclusions.
No matter how imaginative Appellees are in trying to muddy the waters, the
issue herein is not the reasonableness of any fact finding. The appeal deals
exclusively with issues of law in keeping with the original contentions of both
parties when cross moving for summary judgment. It solely involves legal issues
to be reviewed for correctness.
Appellees state "the breach of good faith and fair dealings" is a factual issue.
They ignore the authoritative treatises and multiple appellate decisions of Points
IA, IB and IC of Appellant's brief, holding the court cannot modify unambiguous
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contractual provisions, disregard its express conditions or insert terms that it
believes to be fair.
Appellees likewise distort Appellant's position in Points IIA and IIB.
Although injunctive relief often is considered discretionary, the authorities cited by
Appellant establish, where restrictive covenants are breached, it is the only
appropriate and adequate remedy, so as to restore the status quo. This is
particularly apt when the violative act was knowingly done and CC&R (10.2)
expressly provides for it.
Appellees are correct in stating the failure to award counsel fees is ordinarily
considered to be within the discretion of the lower court. However, as Appellants
addressed in Point III, had the court below applied the controlling law, the failure
to grant reasonable attorney's fees would have exceeded allowable parameters.
This is buttressed by the fact that Appellees erected the fence surreptitiously during
the few days Appellant was out of town and legal fees and costs are provided for in
CC&R (10.2 (a). By declining to grant reimbursement of Appellant's substantial
fees, Appellant has been further penalized although he is the wronged party.
Appellees argue, and set forth case law, unrelated to the issues before this
court. Rather than respond to points and authorities set forth in Appellant's brief,
Appellees use phrases like "unreasonably withheld his permission", "abuses
discretion", "where there is doubt about interpretation of a contract" which are not
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present on this appeal and then cite cases related to such inapplicable premises.
Interestingly, however, in one instance they cite Nixon vs. Nixon (bottom of page
17) holding that "...where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so
provides..." it will be enforced even if the result appears to be harsh and
unreasonable. Even so, Appellant does not acknowledged it is harsh and
unreasonable to enforce a requirement of prior consent when the formidable barrier
ran along Appellant's rear property line and closed off its only remaining
unobstructed side.
The lower court sustained plaintiffs position that prior consent was a
requirement and not a just a courtesy but Appellees nevertheless continue to argue
this without any new foundation or cross-appeal. Likewise, they again urge,
without further facts or law, that the variance vote should be given some
consideration, although it was specified, and the lower court confirmed, that such
procedure relates solely to issues of "design".
Appellees state on page 19 that a party should "not render it difficult or
impossible for the other to continue performance and then take advantage of the
non performance he has caused". Nothing identified by Appellees or appearing in
the record, demonstrates what Appellant improperly did to prevent any
performance. Appellant and Martins just chose not to consent to the fence which
they had the right to do, had their consents been requested.
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Appellees claim they are ignorant of any case law which grants a party the
absolute right to enforce a clear provision of a contract, notwithstanding all the
authorities cited in Appellant's brief in Points 1 A, B and C.
Appellees make an argument of "justified expectations and common
purposes" notwithstanding prior permission (7.5), and the violation being deemed
a nuisance subject to abatement (10.1), are patently clear in the duly adopted
Ranch Place CC&Rs. Should Appellees' position be upheld, express terms of any
CC&Rs, as well as a variety of other contracts would mean little until each was
passed upon, in every case, by a court. If the intent was to make the consent
requirement subject to "reasonableness" it would have been so stated.
Appellees' brief is a broad shotgun presentation quoting general principles
out of context, not directed to the issues of this appeal. They have not rebutted the
material facts or case law set forth in Appellant's brief. It is therefore respectfully
suggested that the need for oral argument has not been demonstrated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^5h day of March2Q03.
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